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THE COVENANT NOT TO SUE: VIRGINIA'S EFFORT TO BURY
THE COMMON LAW RULE REGARDING THE RELEASE OF
JOINT TORTFEASORS
I. INTRODUCTION
The 1979 Virginia General Assembly turned the last shovel of earth
onto the grave of the common law "release rule"' by adopting the cove-
nant not to sue as a viable settlement device in joint tortfeasor actions.2
1. Early common law as developed in England allowed a release of one tortfeasor to act as
a release of all other tortfeasors responsible for the same harm. The law regarded the single
harm as being only one cause of action against the defendants; when a release of a judgment
was effected against one, this destroyed the entire cause of action and, therefore, released
the other tortfeasor. W. PROSsER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 49, at 301 (4th ed. 1971).
2. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-35.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (revised in 1980)
Effect of covenant not to sue or settlement upon liability and contribution
among joint tortfeasors-A. When a covenant not to sue is given in good faith to
one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same wrongful
death:
1. It shall not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or
wrongful death unless its terms so provide; but it shall reduce the claim against the
others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the covenant, or in the amount of
the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater; and
2. It shall discharge the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for contri-
bution to any other tortfeasor.
B. A tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not entitled to
recover contributions from another tortfeasor whose liability for the injury or wrong-
ful death is not extinguished by the settlement, nor in respect to any amount paid in
a settlement which is in excess of what was reasonable.
The preceding form proved to be an unsatisfactory attempt to negate the common law
rule of release and was quickly amended by the 1980 General Assembly to the following:
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-35.1 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
Effect of release or covenant not to sue in respect to liability and contri-
bution among joint tort feasors.-A. When a release or a covenant not to sue is
given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury, or
the same property damage or the same wrongful death:
1. It shall not discharge any of the other tort feasors from liability for the injury,
property damage or wrongful death unless its terms so provide; but any amount re-
covered against the other tort feasors or any one of them shall be reduced by any
amount stipulated by the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it,
whichever is the greater; and
2. It shall discharge the tort feasor to whom it is given from all liability for contri-
bution to any other tort feasor.
B. A tort feasor who enters into a release or covenant not to sue with a claimant is
not entitled to recover by way of contribution from another tort feasor whose liability
for the injury, property damage or wrongful death is not extinguished by the release
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By this statutory adoption, Virginia became the last state to recognize,
either by statute or judicial mandate, that a properly drawn covenant not
to sue can act to release one or more tortfeasors without automatically
releasing all those tortfeasors liable for the same injury or wrongful
death.3 Judicial interpretations of the covenant not to sue,4 particularly
those of California, Michigan and North Carolina, will be examined here
in order to present salient factors for the Virginia practitioner to consider
when drafting a covenant not to sue.
or covenant not to sue, nor in respect to any amount paid by the tort feasor which is
in excess of what was reasonable.
C. A release or covenant not to sue given pursuant to this section shall be subject
to the provisions of §§ 8.01-55 and 8.01-424.
The remainder of this article will refer to the 1980 amended statute unless otherwise noted.
However, practitioners should be aware that the original statute will control any covenant
signed between July 1, 1979 and June 30, 1980.
3. Over the past fifty years all other states have come to recognize the need to eliminate
the harshness and injustice created when an unknowing plaintiff released one defendant and
discovered that he had ended his entire cause of action against any other defendant. Change
first came when states began to recognize a release of one would release all joint tortfeasors
only if they were acting in concert. If the wrongdoers were termed joint tortfeasors only
because their independent and concurrent tortious conduct contributed to the plaintiff's
single injury, they were not automatically released by a settlement with one of the concur-
rent wrongdoers, especially when the release specifically included a reservation of rights
against other co-defendants. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 49, at 301-02.
But many states regarded a release of any kind as an abandonment of a claim. They
consequently adopted the covenant not to sue as an instrument which did not extinguish
the cause of action but rather acted as an agreement between the parties whereby the plain-
tiff would refrain from enforcing a cause of action rather than surrendering it altogether as a
release would. Id. § 49, at 303.
By 1972, 15 states (Arizona, Connecticut, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Minne-
sota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas and Washing-
ton) had modified the "release rule" by judicial recognition that the intention of the parties
should control the effect of a release. Courts of another six states (Colorado, Georgia, Illi-
nois, Ohio, Wyoming and Vermont) allowed a covenant not to sue to act as a release of only
the covenanting parties and not all tortfeasors.
In addition by 1977, 23 states had statutorily adopted the covenant not to sue as an effec-
tive settlement device. See notes 24, 28 and 30 infra.
4. The scope of this article will not include the specialized covenant not to sue known as a
Mary Carter agreement. This represents a new development in tortfeasor settlement devices
and has been declared valid in only a few states. See Maule Industries, Inc. v. Rountree, 264
So. 2d 445 (D.C. Fla. 1972), modified, 284 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1973). But see Lur v. Stinnett,
87 Nev. 402, 488 P.2d 347 (1971) (Mary Carter agreements criticized as being unfairly preju-
dicial to the nonagreeing defendants' rights to a fair trial).
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II. CONTRIBUTION AND RELEASE LAW IN VIRGINIA PRIOR TO THE 1979
STATUTE
A brief history of Virginia's view of contribution, releases and cove-
nants not to sue will be helpful in understanding the newly enacted stat-
ute. As early as 1950, the Virginia Supreme Court merely recognized the
existence of the covenant not to sue but refused to acknowledge that a
covenant which reserved the right to sue other defendants could act as a
release of only the covenanting party, especially if the plaintiff accepted
some form of compensation for the covenant.5
In 1963, Chief Justice Eggleston's opinion in Lackey v. Brooks ac-
knowledged the difference between a covenant not to sue and a release as
stated in the Restatement of Torts section 885(2). 7 However, this dictum
did nothing to advance a modification of Virginia's release law because
the instrument involved was a lease signed before the cause of action
arose. The court ruled that such a lease acted as a covenant not to sue
rather than a release solely because it was signed previous to the exis-
tence of a claim. Furthermore, there had been no accord and satisfaction
associated with the instrument; therefore, it did not relieve all joint
tortfeasors even though one was thereby released.
In 1967, the supreme court further explained that a mere dismissal of a
claim against one tortfeasor did not act as a release of all tortfeasors.8
5. In Shortt v. Hudson Supply & Equip. Co., 191 Va. 306, 60 S.E.2d 900 (1950), the in-
jured party executed a covenant not to sue his employer in exchange for $3500. The Virginia
Supreme Court ruled that he had settled for this sum after having made a common sense
estimate of what he was willing to accept, thus his acceptance acted as an accord and satis-
faction which discharged all tortfeasors. For early Virginia law regarding a release other
than a covenant not to sue, see First & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Bank of Waverly, 170 Va.
496, 197 S.E. 462 (1938).
All courts have recognized the importance of allowing only one complete satisfaction in
order to avoid double recovery and unjust enrichment, but difficulties have arisen in distin-
guishing between a satisfaction of the plaintiff's entire claim of damages and a satisfaction
of the plaintiff's claim against the released defendant. The strict common law rule, as
demonstrated by Shortt, viewed the latter as well as the former as a complete satisfaction
and release of all tortfeasors. See Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 403 (1960).
6. 204 Va. 428, 132 S.E.2d 461 (1963).
7. Adopted in 1939, the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 885 (1939) specified three points con-
cerning release:
1) A valid release of one tortfeasor acts as a release of all tortfeasors unless the
parties to the release agree that the release shall not discharge the others.
2) A covenant not to sue one tortfeasor for a harm does not discharge any other
liable for the harm.
3) Payments by one tortfeasor will accordingly diminish the amount of claim
against another.
8. Dickenson v. Tabb, 208 Va. 184, 156 S.E.2d 795 (1967).
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However, the court again warned that the "acceptance of satisfaction...
operates to extinguish [the] plaintiff's cause of action against other joint
tort-feasors."' 9
Finally, in 1977, an intentional tort case involving a covenant not to sue
was appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court.10 Since all courts recognize
that covenants not to sue, as well as releases, act to release all tortfeasers
if the tort is of an intentional nature, the Virginia decision ruled that the
covenants in the instant case did in fact release all co-defendants. How-
ever, Justice Poff, pointing to the four guiding principles1 concerning all
releases in Virginia, further stated that the plaintiff's acceptance of
$50,000 amounted to satisfaction for the tortious conduct of the two de-
fendants which extinguished the cause of action and released all
tortfeasors. In conclusion, Justice Poff noted, "[u]nfortunately, the rule
sometimes works harsh results. Yet, the rule is one of ancient origin,
honored without exception in this Commonwealth, and fully familiar to
bench and bar. Both counsel and courts must be governed by it."" The
court did not indicate that these rules would be applicable to intentional
torts only.
Recognizing that the judicial branch of Virginia's government was not
inclined to modify the release law, the 1979 General Assembly enacted
the covenant not to sue statute.' s
In like manner the 1950 legislature had changed the common law of
contribution so that this right would be allowed among wrongdoers when
the tort resulted from negligence and involved no moral turpitude. 4 As a
9. Id. at 194, 156 S.E.2d at 802-03.
10. Wright v. Orlowki, 218 Va. 115, 235 S.E.2d 349 (1977) (action brought by the mother
of a teenaged boy paralyzed when several classmates jokingly threw him out of a window).
Two covenants not to sue were executed between the plaintiff and two of the defendants'
insurance companies for $25,000 each. The instruments expressly reserved the right to sue
all co-defendants but agreed not to sue their insurance companies. There was further evi-
dence that the plaintiffs orally agreed to take a nonsuit as to the two defendants whose
insurance companies had settled. The trial court ruled the signed instruments plus the oral
agreements constituted a release of all defendants. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed.
11. The four principles invoked were:
1) A release activates the common law rule.
2) The making of an accord and acceptance of satisfaction will effect a release.
3) When a plaintiff accepts satisfaction from one tortfeasor for his part in the tort,
this releases all tortfeasors.
4) These rules of law cannot be defeated by a unilateral reservation of rights.
Id. at 120, 235 S.E.2d at 353.
12. Id. at 122-23, 235 S.E.2d at 354.
13. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-35.1 (Curn. Supp. 1979). See note 2 supra for full text.
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-34 (Repl. Vol. 1977). A right of contribution will lie even though
[Vol. 14:809
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further modification of joint tortfeasor law, another 1950 statute 5
changed the common law position of allowing a judgment without satis-
faction to act as a release.16 The modification allowed such a judgment
against one tortfeasor to act as a discharge of all tortfeasors only if one of
the judgments had been fully satisfied and accepted by the injured
party. 1 7 However, the revisers' note following the statute states that satis-
faction is determined by case law and could include full payment, accord
and satisfaction, or a covenant not to sue supported by consideration. Ob-
viously because of the enactment of section 8.01-35.1 of the Virginia
Code, a covenant not to sue supported by consideration should not be
deemed a satisfaction sufficient to release all tortfeasors unless the
amount paid can be judged to be full compensation for the claim."" Oth-
erwise the covenant statute9 would have no meaning and any considera-
tion paid in exchange for the release or covenant not to sue one co-defen-
dant would release all co-defendants.
III. STATUTORY SETTLEMENT DEVICES IN OTHER STATES
In order to utilize the covenant statute, one must understand the tech-
nical similarities and differences between Virginia's statute and the re-
lease and covenant statutes in other states. Particular attention should be
given to the 1955 Uniform Act as adopted in North Carolina. This stat-
there has been no previous judgment determining the issues of negligence or contributory
negligence; however, there must have been a compromise settlement paid. See North River
Ins. Co. v. Davis, 274 F. Supp. 146 (W.D. Va. 1967), aff'd, 392 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1968)
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jewel Tea Co., 202 Va. 527, 118 S.E.2d 646 (1961).
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-443 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
16. See McLaughlin v. Siegel, 166 Va. 374, 185 S.E. 873 (1936).
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-443 (Repl. Vol. 1977). This statute is very similar to the UNI-
FORM CONTRMUTION AMONG JoiNT ToRTrAsoRs AcT § 3(e), 12 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 89
(1955) [hereinafter cited as 1955 UNIFORM AcT] which reads: "The recovery of a judgment
for an injury or wrongful death against one tortfeasor does not of itself discharge the other
tortfeasors from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless the judgment is satisfied.
The satisfaction of the judgment does not impair any right of contribution."
18. See generally McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943) for some insight into
determining what full satisfaction may be. Each case will vary; the facts and intentions of
the parties should prevail over assumptions based on the mere fact of settlement. Ordinarily
the claimant would not obtain a full satisfaction from one or more tortfeasors unless the
others were judgment proof. Therefore the presumption should be against full satisfaction
and discharge of all co-defendants.
The opinion further states that the instrument involved reserved rights against some de-
fendants and it was, therefore, immaterial whether the document was deemed a covenant
not to sue or a release. In either case it did not act as a release of more than the covenanting
parties.
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-35.1 (Cur. Supp. 1980).
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ute20 served as the model for Virginia's new law.
Most all of the twenty-four states that now have covenant not to sue
laws and/or modified release laws have enacted them with the hope of
encouraging settlements and preventing plaintiffs from arbitrarily choos-
ing where the burden of common fault must fall.21 This also was the goal
of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 22 when they included sec-
tion four in the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act in 1939.22
While this Act speaks only of releases, the courts in most of the eleven
adopting states24 have viewed releases and covenants on an equal basis so
long as neither acts as a full satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim.
25
Furthermore, section four" of the 1955 revised version,2 as adopted by
20. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1B-4 (Repl. Vol. 1969). The 1979 Virginia drafters were not willing
to adopt the entire 1955 Uniform Act because it was a contribution act which they felt was
not needed in Virginia. Moreover, they omitted all language of release found in the North
Carolina statute. However, the 1980 amended version acknowledges that a release of one
tortfeasor will act just as a similar covenant not to sue.
21. E.g., Markey v. Skog, 129 N.J. Super. 192, 322 A.2d 513 (1974); Wheeler v. Denton, 9
N.C. App. 167, 175 S.E.2d 769 (1970).
22. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 12
UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 57 (1939) [hereinafter cited as 1939 UNIFORM ACT].
23. 1939 UNIFORM AcT § 4 reads:
[Release; Effect on Injured Person's Claim]-A release by the injured person
of one joint tortfeasor, whether before or after judgment, does not discharge the other
tortfeasors unless the release so provides; but reduces the claim against the other
tortfeasors in the amount of the consideration paid for the release, or in any amount
or proportion by which the release provides that the total claim shall be reduced, if
greater than the consideration paid.
24. Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1001 to -1009 (Repl. Vol. 1962); Delaware, DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10 §§ 6301-08 (Revised 1974); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 663-11 to -17
(Repl. Vol. 1976); Idaho, IDAHO CODE §§ 6-803 to -806 (1979); Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art.
50, §§ 16-24 (Repl. Vol. 1979); Mississippi, Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-5 (1972); New Jersey,
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:53A-1 to -5 (West Cum. Supp. 1979); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 41-3-1 to -8 (1978); Pennsylvania, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8321-27 (Purdon Curn.
Supp. 1979); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-6-1 to -11 (Repl. Vol. 1969); South Dakota,
S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 15-8-11 to -22 (1967).
25. 1955 UNIFORM AcT § 4, Commissioners' Note. Most state courts viewed a special or
limited release as releasing only the covenanting tortfeasor while a general release released
all others if the intention to do so was clear and if the covenanting party was making a full
settlement for all damages connected with the tort. See, e.g., Weldon v. Lehmann, 226 Miss.
600, 84 So. 2d 796 (1956).
26. 1955 UNIFORM AcT § 4 states:
[Release or Covenant Not to Sue]-When a release or a covenant not to sue or
not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in
tort for the same injury or the same wrongful death:
(a) It does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or
wrongful death unless its terms so provide; but it reduces the claim against the others
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an additional nine states,2 8 included the words "covenant not to sue" in
order to make this point clear.29
Four additional states have enacted individual covenant not to sue or
release laws without adopting either version of the Uniform Act.30 Two of
these, California and Michigan, mention both releases and covenants not
to sue as acceptable devices. Missouri and West Virginia mention release
only. However, court rulings in all four states indicate either directly or
by implication that a properly drawn covenant will release only a settling
tortfeasor just as would a properly drawn special release under the appli-
cable statutes.31
With the enactment of the 1979 covenant law, Virginia was the only
state to limit its settlements to covenants not to sue. Because of the past
conservative tenor of the Virginia courts, it is safe to assume that any
form of release signed between July 1, 1979 and June 30, 1980 will be
interpreted as a release of all tortfeasors. The distinction between the two
instruments rests on whether the phraseology indicates an abandonment
to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the
amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater; and,
(b) It discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for contribution
to any other tortfeasor.
27. The 1955 UNiFoRM ACT was revised in 1955 because adopting states had greatly modi-
fied its provisions. To re-establish some degree of uniformity, to reconcile the serious varia-
tions, and to eliminate the confusion, the Commissioners studied all variations and adopted
the most popular and workable solutions. 1955 UNIFORM AT, CoMmixSsIoNERS' PREFATORY
NOTE.
28. Alaska, ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.16.010-.060 (1978); Colorado, COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 13-50.5-
101 to -106 (Cum. Supp. 1979); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.31 (West Cum. Supp. 1980);
Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231B, §§ 1-4 (Michie-Law Co-op 1974); Nevada,
NEv. REV. STAT. § 17.225-.305 (1979); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1B-1 to -6 (Repl.
Vol. 1969 & Cum. Supp. 1977); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-38-01 to -04 (Repl.
Vol. 1976); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 23-3101 to -3106 (Cum. Supp. 1979); Wyoming,
Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-1-110 to -113 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
29. See generally Ottinger v. Chronister, 13 N.C. App. 91, 185 S.E.2d 292 (1971). Cf.
Simpson v. Plyler, 258 N.C. 390, 128 S.E.2d 843 (1963) (decided before North Carolina had
adopted the 1955 Uniform Act, and holding that a release would act as an extinguishment of
the action while the covenant would not).
30. California, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980); Michigan, MIcH. CoMP. LAws
ANN. § 600.2925(d) (Cum. Supp. 1979); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.060 (Vernon 1953);
West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 55-7-12 (1966).
31. Stewart v. Cox, 55 Cal. 2d 857, 362 P.2d 345, 13 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1961); Thomas v.
Checker Cab Co., 66 Mich. App. 152, 238 N.W.2d 558 (1975);New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v.
O'Brien, 330 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1960). While no West Virginia case was found which ad-
dressed the effect of a covenant not to sue, the liberal view of the state courts since 1960
indicates the same result. See Tennant v. Craig, 156 W. Va. 632, 195 S.E.2d 727 (1973);
Hardin v. New York Cent. R.R., 145 W. Va. 676, 116 S.E.2d 697 (1960).
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of a claim or merely an agreement to enforce an existing cause of action.3 2
Most courts that use judicial rather than statutory precedent to distin-
guish between covenants and releases do so based on the language used,
the amount paid, the substance of the agreement and intention of the
parties. However, courts issuing decisions based on statutory interpreta-
tion concentrate on the technical language used in the instrument. Most
courts refuse to allow the title of the instrument to be a determining
factor."3
It seems likely that it was a recognition that content should rule over
title that caused the Virginia legislators to amend their original covenant
statute, and that the amended version eliminates any artificial distinction
between the two and allows either to act as a release of only one
tortfeasor so long as the language is not overly broad.
In looking to the proper language necessary for an appropriate release
or covenant not to sue, careful attention must be paid to whether the
applicable statute expressly requires a reservation of rights. Those states
operating under either of the Uniform Acts do not have this requirement;
the instrument extends only to those tortfeasors who are expressly de-
scribed or identified, unless the terms provide otherwise." The California
and Michigan statutes are identical in that they expressly prevent release
of all tortfeasors unless the terms of the instrument so provide.35 How-
ever, the Missouri statute s has been judicially interpreted in at least one
case to require an express reservation of rights to preserve a cause of ac-
tion against the noncovenanting parties even though the statute does not
imply this requirement.37
32. But see Pellett v. Sonotone Corp., 26 Cal. 2d 705, 711, 160 P.2d 783, 786 (1945), where
the court stated:
[Tihe distinction between a release and a covenant not to sue is entirely artificial. As
between the parties to the agreement, the final result is the same in both cases,
namely, that there is no further recovery from the defendant who makes the settle-
ment, and the difference in the effect as to third parties is based mainly, if not en-
tirely, on the fact that in one case there is an immediate release, whereas in the other
there is merely an agreement not to prosecute a suit.
33. See, e.g. Rector v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
34. Rio Grande Gas Co. v. Stahmann Farms, Inc., 80 N.M. 432, 457 P.2d 364 (1969);
Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 409 Pa. 357, 186 A.2d 399 (1962). Cf. note 38 infra and accom-
panying text.
35. See note 30 supra.
36. Id.
37. Swope v. General Motors Corp., 445 F. Supp. 1222 (W.D. Mo. 1978). "What" is re-
leased and not "who" is released by the document is important. The release of only one
tortfeasor as mentioned in the instrument is not conclusively a special release. The court
will look to whether the entire cause of action was satisfied. See Liberty v. J.A. Tobin Con-
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The close technical similarity between the Virginia statute and the
statutes of North Carolina, California and Michigan would indicate that
no reservation will be required; but all state courts previously mentioned
will not hesitate to rule to the contrary if given a loosely drawn instru-
ment purporting to release any person, corporation, association or part-
nership other than the convenantee for any and all claims which the cove-
nantor might have as a result of the tort."8 Words of restriction should be
included in order to mention that the consideration paid is to be received
in full for all claims against the covenantee only and is to be accepted as
final adjustment and settlement for injuries for which the covenantee,
only, may be liable.39
Apart from the technical criteria for drafting an acceptable and binding
covenant not to sue, there are several considerations which will influence
its effective use as a settlement device in Virginia. Again in comparison
with the statutes of California, Michigan and North Carolina, each con-
sideration will be discussed separately throughout the remainder of this
article.
IV. SCOPE OF THE STATUTE WITH REGARD TO PERSONAL INJURY,
PROPERTY DAMAGE AND WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIMS
With regard to the four statutes under study herein, the Virginia cove-
nant law, before the 1980 amendment, specifically applied to torts involv-
ing a personal injury or wrongful death. Similar language appears in the
Michigan and North Carolina statutes. 0 The California law is more gen-
eral in its reference to tortfeasors "claimed to be liable for the same
tort., 41 The question arises as to whether property damage torts will be
included under the umbrella of the original statute.
Virginia's 1980 amendment specifically includes torts involving prop-
erty damage. Consequently, any covenant or release involving such a tort,
executed after July 1, 1980 will be valid. By enacting the change, the Vir-
ginia General Assembly demonstrated its unwillingness to leave the ques-
str. Co., 512 S.W.2d 886 (Mo. App. 1974).
38. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Winchester Drive-In Theatre, Inc., 351 F.2d 925
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1965); Clark v. Brooks, 377 A.2d 365 (Del. Super. Ct.
1977); Hurt v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Dean v. Bennett
M. Lifter, Inc., 336 So. 2d 393 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Battle v. Clanton, 27 N.C. App.
616, 220 S.E.2d 97 (1975).
39. Swope v. General Motors Corp., 445 F. Supp. 1222 (W.D. Mo. 1978).
40. MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 600.2925(d) (Cur. Supp. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1B-4
(Repl. Vol. 1969).
41. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980).
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tion open to interpretation by the state courts. However, the application
of similar statutes in other states and a review of related Virginia deci-
sions indicate that Virginia courts may have allowed releases and cove-
nants to be operative in torts involving property damage.
The statutory language of Virginia's 1979 law clearly allowed all per-
sonal injury actions to be covered, just as they have been in other states.42
The similar North Carolina statute" has also allowed covenants and re-
leases to be effective in property damage cases. The language of section
one of the 1955 Uniform Act, as adopted in North Carolina, expressly
includes a reference to both property damage and personal injury.44 In
like manner, the California courts have recognized the usefulness of a
covenant not to sue in a property case45 even though California has not
adopted the express language of the Uniform Act.
In addition, the Virginia courts, in recognizing the interrelationship be-
tween the original covenant statute and the joint tortfeasor contribution
statute,4 may have interpreted them similarly. The Virginia Supreme
Court, in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Jewel Tea Co.,47 allowed
contribution to include recovery for property damage as well as personal
injury. The insurer, as subrogee of a joint tortfeasor, was permitted to
enforce contribution for both types of claims. The court was willing to
allow contribution even though that statute did not specify what type of
negligent actions would be covered therein. It seems unlikely that a judi-
cial interpretation of the 1979 covenant law would have rejected the in-
terrelationship of two statutes whose purposes were so similar.
However, the legislature may have been justified in believing an
amendment was necessary. The right to release or covenant with one
tortfeasor without releasing all other wrongdoers is a statutory right in
42. Cobb v. Southern Pac. Co., 251 Cal. App. 2d 929, 59 Cal. Rptr. 916 (1967); Sobotta v.
Vogel, 37 Mich. App. 59, 194 N.W.2d 564 (1971); Battle v. Clanton, 27 N.C. App. 616, 220
S.E.2d 97 (1975).
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1B-4 (Repl. Vol. 1969).
44. Id. § 1B-i(a).
45. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Winchester Drive-In Theatre, Inc., 351 F.2d 925
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1965).
46. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-34 (Repl. Vol. 1977). Both the contribution statute and the
covenant not to sue statute are found in tit. 8.01, art. 3 of the Virginia Code and were
enacted to nullify the harsh common law rules regarding joint tortfeasors. There is Virginia
case law to support the proposition that all code provisions dealing with the same subject
should be construed together and reconciled. Shepherd v. F.J. Kress Box Co., 154 Va. 421,
153 S.E. 649 (1930). Therefore the statutes should be read in conjunction with one another
so as to allow both to apply to personal injury and to property damage.
47. 202 Va. 527, 118 S.E.2d 646 (1961).
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derogation of the common law and, thereby, requires strict construction."
A strict construction of the original law may have rejected its validity in
any property damage case solely because such a situation was not speci-
fied at the same time that personal injury and wrongful death situations
were clearly expressed. The General Assembly chose to clarify the issue
by legislation rather than to leave it open to judicial construction.
The wrongful death language in section 8.01-35.14s represents a more
obtuse problem. Many practitioners feel that an amendment to section
8.01-5050 is necessary in order for the covenant law to take full effect. The
wrongful death" claim established in section 8.01-50 is wholly statutory
and reverses the common law concept that a tortfeasor who negligently
caused the death of another was immune from civil liability. This section
confers a new right of action upon the personal representative of the de-
ceased as a substitute for the decedent's cause of action for injuries sus-
tained.51 Because the right is statutorily conceived, it must be strictly
construed.52 Many practitioners feel, therefore, that an amendment which
specifically grants the right to settle a wrongful death action by a valid
covenant not to sue is appropriate. However, such an amendment seems
unnecessary in light of present persuasive authority and related wrongful
death statutes found in the Virginia Code.
Again one must recognize the purposes of the contribution and cove-
nant not to sue statutes-both were enacted to negate the harshness of
the common law concerning joint tortfeasors. Virginia courts have had no
difficulty in allowing contribution for wrongful death actions.5 " Case law
in North Carolina and California also supports the recovery of contribu-
tion in such claims." In addition, both a California court "5 and a Florida
48. See Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kinzer, 206 Va. 175, 142 S.E.2d 514 (1965); 17 MIcHmE's
JURISPRUDENCE, Statutes § 70 (1979).
49. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-35.1 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
50. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-50 (Rep. Vol. 1977).
51. Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969).
52. See generally Simmons v. Wilder, 6 N.C. App. 179, 169 S.E.2d 480 (1969).
53. In Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Minnifield, 213 Va. 797, 196 S.E.2d 75 (1973), the
Supreme Court of Virginia allowed Nationwide to obtain contribution from a joint
tortfeasor in an action involving two death claims paid by Nationwide on behalf of its
insured.
54. Wiener v. United Air Lines, 216 F. Supp. 701 (S.D. Cal. 1962), aff'd in part, modified
in part, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); Jordan v. Blackwelder,
250 N.C. 189, 108 S.E.2d 429 (1959); Etheridge v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 249 N.C. 367,
106 S.E.2d 560 (1959). A wrongful death provision was added to § 1 and § 4 of the 1955
Uniform Act in order to cover wrongful death claims, including but not limited to those
falling under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 1955 UNIFORM ACT, § 1 Commissioners'
Note.
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court56 have indicated that a wrongful death action may be settled as to
one tortfeasor without releasing other tortfeasors when the settlement de-
vice is one included under the appropriate statutes.51 In light of these
decisions, section 8.01-50 may not be interpreted as a bar to partially set-
tling a wrongful death claim by a release or covenant, especially when
that section is read in conjunction with the express language in section
8.01-35.1. 58
Furthermore, legislators have long recognized the need to compromise a
wrongful death claim as evidenced by their enactment of section 8.01-
55.59 Since the purpose of both a compromise statute and a covenant not
to sue statute is to encourage settlement of tort claims and to minimize
extensive and costly litigation, there should be no judicial objection to a
partial release or covenant releasing only specified tortfeasors in a wrong-
ful death action so long as the covenant is properly approved by the ap-
propriate court.6 0 The amended version of the covenant statute eliminates
any question that a release or covenant may not be effective in such
55. Steele v. Hash, 212 Cal. App. 2d 1, 27 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1963). The plaintiff, as adminis-
trator of decedent's estate, received $2500 in exchange for an agreement to dismiss the ac-
tion against one of the two automobile drivers responsible for the collision in which dece-
dent was killed.
The district court affirmed the lower court ruling that evidence of this settlement should
be submitted to the jury in order to allow an appropriate reduction of any further amount
awarded to the plaintiff. The court determined that a subsequent verdict in favor of the
remaining tortfeasor was based on the jury's finding him free of negligence rather than rul-
ing that a full satisfaction had been given to the plaintiff by way of the $2500.
56. In Frier's Inc. v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 355 So. 2d 208 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978),
the court ruled the settlement agreement between an automobile owner and his insurer and
the mother of a passenger killed in an automobile-train collision was both a valid Mary
Carter agreement and a valid covenant not to enforce judgment under the Florida statute.
See note 4 supra.
57. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.31 (West Cum. Supp.
1979).
58. Statutes dealing with closely related subjects must be construed together so that ef-
fect may be given to their total provisions. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. White, 158 Va. 243, 160 S.E.
218 (1931).
59. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-55 (Repl. Vol. 1977) reads in part:
The personal representative of the deceased may compromise any claim to damages
arising under or by virtue of § 8.01-50, including claims under the provision of a
liability insurance policy, before or after action brought, with the approval of the
court wherein any such action has been brought, or if none has been brought, with
the consent of any circuit court.
60. In Caputo v. Holt, 217 Va. 302, 228 S.E.2d 134 (1976), the court declared that a
$20,000 settlement received by an administrator who was not a statutory beneficiary did not
prevent the proper administratrix from recovering a further settlement of $25,000 since the
court had not given its approval of the compromise.
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claims. It concludes with the caveat that any release or covenant will be
subject to the provisions of section 8.01-55.
V. COVENANTS INVOLVING PERSONS UNDER A DISABILITY
Just as required for a compromise settlement in wrongful death claims,
Virginia law81 requires that any settlement of a claim involving a person
under a disability be approved by an appropriate court. Such court ap-
proval is necessary for a compromise made on behalf of an incompetent,
insane, incapacitated, or infant plaintiff.62 And just as in the wrongful
death situation, the amended version of section 8.01-35.1 specifies that
the provisions of section 8.01-424 must be followed if the covenant or re-
lease is executed on behalf of a "disabled" person. A covenant or release
which is not properly approved will not be binding on either covenanting
party. Further, the court approval of such a settlement and receipt of the
funds by the clerk or a duly appointed fiduciary will not be deemed to be
full satisfaction of the entire claim against all tortfeasors unless the terms
of the settlement itself so provide. In the North Carolina case of Payseur
v. RudisiI63 the court noted that once a judge approves of the compro-
mise, the infant or disabled plaintiff has the same rights as an adult in
reference to his ability to sue other tortfeasors; any other rule would ob-
literate the protective posture of the court in overseeing settlements in-
volving disabled persons."
VI. ELEMENTS OF GOOD FAITH
The Virginia covenant statute, as well as the California and Michigan
statutes, provides that a discharge is effective only if the release or cove-
nant is given in good faith. A similar requirement was added to section
four of the 1955 Uniform Act to give a court the opportunity "to deter-
mine whether the transaction [is] collusive .... ,,15 This provision allows
a look beyond the transaction in order to ascertain whether it was in-
spired by spite, sympathy, kinship, or ease of collection.8
Because an injured party may accept a nominal settlement from any of
61. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-424 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
62. Id., Revisers' Note.
63. 15 N.C. App. 57, 189 S.E.2d 562, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 758, 191 S.E.2d 356 (1972).
64. Id.
65. 1955 UNwoRM AcT, § 4 Commissioners' Note. The omission of the good faith provision
in the 1939 Uniform Act had prevented realization of the goal of equitable financial distri-
bution among the parties at fault; accord, Frier's Inc. v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 355 So. 2d
208 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
66. 1955 UNIFORM AcT, Commissioners' Note.
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the tortfeasors and thereby discharge the covenantee from further liabil-
ity for contribution,67 a good faith provision is necessary in order to carry
out one of the stated purposes of the 1955 Uniform Act-that of prevent-
ing a plaintiff from pursuing a disproportionate claim against a nonset-
tling tortfeasor. s Otherwise the plaintiff could bring great financial pres-
sure on a nonsettling tortfeasor by accepting unreasonably small
settlements from one or more co-defendants and requesting the remain-
der of his damages from the tortfeasor who might be less judgment proof
or have more insurance coverage.
The California case of River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court9
contains a full discussion of the good faith requirement for releases. In
explaining what collusion and good faith are, the court of appeals said:
Any negotiated settlement involves cooperation, but not necessarily collu-
sion. It becomes collusive when it is aimed to injure the interests of an ab-
sent tortfeasor. Although many kinds of collusive injury are possible, the
most obvious and frequent is that created by an unreasonably cheap settle-
ment. Applied pro tanto to the ultimate judgment, such a settlement con-
tributes little toward equitable-even though unequal-sharing .... The
price of a settlement is the prime badge of its good or bad faith.70
In determining what monetary levels will invalidate a settlement, the
court pointed to generally accepted criteria
recognized by the personal injury bar, insurance claims departments and
pretrial settlement courts. When testing the good faith of a settlement
figure, a court may enlist the guidance of the judge's personal experience
and of experts in the field. Representated by knowledgeable counsel, settle-
ment negotiators can predict with some assurance whether a settlement is
within the reasonable range permitted by the criterion of good faith.7 1
However, a North Carolina court has pointed out that a mere inequal-
ity in the ultimate settlement figure will not automatically indicate bad
67. VA. COD- ANN. § 8.01-35.1(A)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
68. 1955 UNIFORM AcT, Commissioners' Note.
69. 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1972). Two children made claims against
several joint tortfeasors for damages for their own personal injuries and for the wrongful
deaths of their parents. Three of the defendants settled the claims for $1,290,000. An agree-
ment approved by the trial court without the knowledge of the remaining defendant appor-
tioned the settlements as to the wrongful death claims at $800,000 leaving $490,000 for the
personal injury awards, thus subjecting the remaining defendant to the potentially larger
claim for personal injuries. The defendant argued that the settlements were invalid for lack
of good faith. The court partially agreed but refused to nullify the contracts and permitted a
separate trial to determine if bad faith was present and if damages were appropriate.
70. Id. at 996, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
71. Id. at 998, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 506-07.
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faith.7 2 Many times a tortfeasor may wish to negotiate a settlement for
his own best interests whether they be for financial advantage or for the
purpose of finality of litigation. The validity of the release will not be
questioned because of the unequal proportion of his settlement in rela-
tion to the damages of the plaintiff unless there is a showing of collusion
or bad faith.73 This is especially true if the defendant is insolvent, unin-
sured, or underinsured.7 4
The illustration of potential bad faith discussed in Lareau v. Southern
Pacific Transportation Co.7 5 may be helpful in understanding this issue.
The injured parties were involved in an automobile accident followed by
an automobile-train collision. The first collision resulted in only minor
lacerations for Mrs. Lareau and undetermined injuries to her retarded
son. The second collision, only nine minutes later, resulted in major back
injuries to Mrs. Lareau and fatal head injuries to her son. Mr. and Mrs.
Lareau settled with three of the four co-defendants for a total of $130,000
apportioned as follows: $30,000 for Mr. Lareau's injuries, $6,000 for Mrs.
Lareau's injuries, and $94,000 for the son's wrongful death claim. There-
after a jury verdict of $125,000 for Mrs. Lareau's injuries was returned
against Southern Pacific. The $6,000 previously allocated by settlement to
these injuries was deducted, leaving a judgment against the railroad of
$119,000.
The parties had previously acknowledged that Mrs. Lareau's claim was
the highest, and therefore, the court had set a $50,000 upper limit on the
wrongful death claim and a $150,000 limit on Mrs. Lareau's personal inju-
ries. Thus, the $94,000 wrongful death and the $6,000 personal injury ap-
portionments in the covenant did indeed raise a question of bad faith.
Consequently the court granted Southern Pacific's motion for a separate
trial to litigate the issues of good faith and damages but refused to find a
lack of good faith as a matter of law. The ruling indicated that there may
have been a justification for the seemingly disproportionate settlement;
evidence of why the railroad refused to participate in settlement negotia-
tions and its reasonableness in insisting on a trial would be relevant to
the issue of good faith.
72. Wheeler v. Denton, 9 N.C. App. 167, 175 S.E. 2d 769 (1970).
73. See, e.g. Stambaugh v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1976);
Lareau v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 783, 118 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1975).
74. 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 238, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843, 848 (1976). The court ruled that a defen-
dant's settlement for the full amount of his insurance coverage was not enough to indicate a
bad faith settlement in a wrongful death action worth many times that amount, especially in
light of no lower court charge of bad faith.
75. 44 Cal. App. 3d 783, 118 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1975).
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As seen in Lareau, the conduct and motives of all covenanting parties
will be taken into account in determining the good faith issue."8 Depend-
ing upon who acted in bad faith, a court may declare the settlement con-
tract invalid or may allow a civil claim for damages. If the plaintiff acted
in bad faith but the settling tortfeasor did not, the decision in River Gar-
den Farms suggests that the contract will be upheld but the nonsettling
tortfeasor will have a claim for damages against the plaintiff." The dam-
ages should be measured by the portion of the judgment the settling
tortfeasor would have been liable for had he not been released by the
settlement. "In money terms, he [the nonsettling tortfeasor] receives pro
rata rather than pro tanto credit against the judgment. 78
However, if the settling tortfeasor has acted in bad faith, the court,
upon motion by either the plaintiff or the nonparticipant,7 9 will declare
the instrument void and allow the plaintiff to bring suit against any or all
tortfeasors. If the nonsettling tortfeasor is sued alone, he may be allowed
to join the tortfeasor who acted in bad faith as a party defendant, thereby
protecting any contribution claim he may have against his co-defendant.80
In practice, the question of bad faith may be litigated apart from the
tort claim.81 Once a settlement allocates a disproportionate amount to a
certain wrongdoer, the nonsettling tortfeasor may bring a suit to deter-
mine if bad faith existed. The issue of bad faith is a question of fact
based on the evidence in each case, and further guidelines are impossible
to establish.82 The practitioner must keep in mind possible motives of
spite, sympathy, and kinship as well as adequate or inadequate insurance
coverage in deciding whether an apparently small settlement seems to be
the result of collusion and bad faith.
VII. RIGHTS OF SETTLING AND NONSETTLING TORTFEASORS AFTER
EXECUTION OF A VALID COVENANT NOT TO SUE
Subsection A(2) of the Virginia covenant statute discharges a settling
tortfeasor from any obligation to contribute to other joint tortfeasors who
may be liable for the same injury or wrongful death. Similar provisions
found in most other release statutes including those following the 1955
76. Id. at 798, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
77. 26 Cal. App. 986, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1972).
78. Id. at 1001, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 509.
79. A third person whose interests are affected by an illegal contract may invoke the ille-
gality as a defense to the contract. 14 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1630 B at 31 (3d ed. 1972).
80. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 1000, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
81. 44 Cal. App. 3d 783, 118 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1975).
82. Id.
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Uniform Act have been interpreted to prevent a nonsettling tortfeasor
from receiving any contribution from a settling co-defendant.8 This
greatly encourages settlements by allowing a covenantee to "close the file
as to his liability.' ' "
However, this section presents an important consideration for the non-
settling tortfeasor. He must be aware of any increased liability he may
incur if the released tortfeasor settles for less than his proportionate
share. The remaining defendant may be liable for the balance of the en-
tire judgment. While this system may seem a bit inequitable, it does con-
tinue to encourage settlement. A plaintiff is willing to settle because he is
allowed to receive as complete a satisfaction as before. He receives the
settlement figure plus any amount awarded against the nonsettling
tortfeasor. It also encourages the covenantee or releasee to settle so as to
totally extinguish his liability. Additionally the largest burden of the
claim rightly falls on the party who was willing to settle.
In pursuit of a similar objective, subsection B of section 8.01-35.15 pre-
vents the settling tortfeasor from obtaining contribution from a nonset-
tling defendant in most situations. This is true even if a settling party
pays an amount greater than his proportional share of negligence. Again
those principles of equity which prevent a settling party from being
forced to contribute to another wrongdoer also dictate that the same set-
tling party not be allowed to claim contribution from anyone whose liabil-
ity has not been extinguished and who has not been a party to the settle-
ment agreement. If the settling tortfeasor were allowed to force
contribution, the threat of unreasonably high settlements would increase.
83. Stambaugh v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1976); Hester
v. Gatlin, 332 So. 2d 660 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Boston Edison Co. v. Tritsch, 370 Mass.
260, 346 N.E.2d 901 (1976); Levi v. Montgomery, 120 N.W.2d 383 (N.D. 1963).
84. 1955 UrFORM Ac § 4, Commissioners' Note at 99. Section 4 of the 1955 UNIFORM
ACT modified § 5 of the 1939 UNIFORM AcT which had prevented rather than encouraged
settlements by failing to completely discharge a settling tortfeasor's liability unless the re-
lease had expressly provided for a reduction of damages "to the extent of the pro rata share
of the released tortfeasor." Id.
Under the earlier UNWORM ACT, a defendant was unwilling to pay for a release or cove-
nant before his pro rata share had been determined because he might have remained liable
for contribution if his settlement had been less than his share. Subsequent to the 1955 UNI-
FORM ACT, decisions in those states following the 1939 UNIFORM ACT have adopted the 1955
ACr's reasoning and prevented a nonsettling tortfeasor from recovering contribution when
he has been ordered to pay more than his pro rata share. Tino v. Stout, 90 N.J. Super. 395,
217 A.2d 885 (1966). However the nonsettling tortfeasor is often given credit for only a pro
rata reduction of the claim rather than a pro tanto credit when the settling tortfeasor pays
more than his pro rata share. Theobald v. Angelos, 44 N.J. 228, 208 A.2d 129 (1965).
85. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-35.1 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
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The singular exception occurs if the instrument involved completely ex-
tinguishes the entire cause of action.8 6 Such a situation could arise if the
release or covenant were so loosely worded as to release all other
tortfeasors or if the settlement figure were so large that the plaintiff had
received total reimbursement for his loss. Such exception has previously
been followed by several courts even though no preliminary judgment had
determined joint liability. Nevertheless, a separate action to enforce con-
tribution would then require a determination that the nonsettling party
was, indeed, liable and that the covenant or release had extinguished all
such liability.87 If the joint liability of the defendants is not established or
if bad faith between the covenanting parties is proven, the nonsettling
tortfeasor need not contribute,ss even if the amount paid is large enough
to satisfy the plaintiff's entire claim.
The problem presented by subsection B is that it tends to negate one of
the purposes of a covenant or release-the avoidance of litigation. If a
settling tortfeasor is allowed to enforce contribution upon a charge that
his covenant or release extinguished the entire cause of action, any poten-
tial contributor must first be sued for contribution and would then wish
to lengthen litigation by questioning the issues of liability and bad faith.
However, most authorities believe this weakness is outweighed by such
benefits as equalizing the financial burden among wrongdoers and avoid-
ing needless litigation when there is no question that a covenant has
failed to extinguish the entire tort claim.
Another matter to consider is notice of settlement. Most courts do not
require that a tortfeasor notify another defendant of his intention to set-
86. Subsection B of the original covenant law was taken verbatim from the 1955 UNIFORM
AcT § 1(d). However, the 1980 version contains several substitutions and additions. The new
language makes no substantive change but merely erases any doubt that a "settlement" may
be anything but a release or covenant not to sue. The clarification also specifies that a
tortfeasor may not recover "by way of contribution" from a nonsettling tortfeasor if the
settling defendant pays an amount more than he reasonably should have paid. VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-35.1 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
87. Halifax Chick Express, Inc. v. Young, 50 Del. 596, 137 A.2d 743 (1957); O'Keefe v.
Baltimore Transit Co., 201 Md. 345, 94 A.2d 26 (1953); Swartz v. Sunderland, 403 Pa. 222,
169 A.2d 289 (1961). But cf. Best Sanitary Disposal Co. v. Little Food Town Inc., 339 So.2d
222 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (release purported to be only a financial arrangement and was
not intended to affect the liability of the parties. The court ruled the settling tortfeasor
could not enforce contribution because the $45,000 settlement figure did not extinguish the
other defendants' liability even though a later verdict was for the exact amount of the previ-
ous settlement).
88. Drumgoole v. VEPCO, 170 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Va. 1959); see Alamida v. Wilson, 53
Hawaii 398, 495 P.2d 585 (1972); Nationwide v. Jewel Tea Co., 202 Va. 527, 118 S.E.2d 646
(1961).
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tie, even though the settlement may be an extinguishment of the entire
claim and, thereby, establish a right to receive contribution from the non-
settling defendant.6 9 Many courts have ruled that the right of contribu-
tion arises from the injury caused by the concurring negligent acts and
remains inchoate and contingent until one of the tortfeasors pays a full
satisfaction. 90 In such a jurisdiction, a nonsettling party is put on con-
structive notice of his contribution liability at the time that tort occurs.
In contrast, Virginia contribution law has been interpreted to mean
that the right to contribution arises only when one joint tortfeasor has
paid a claim for which the other tortfeasor is liable.91 Even with this dif-
ference it seems unlikely that actual notice of a settlement need be given
to a nonsettling co-defendant for the simple reason that a settling
tortfeasor will not consciously agree to pay a sum so large as to extinguish
the entire cause of action and activate the right to contribution.
As originally enacted, section 8.01-35.1(A)(1) provided that the claim
against other tortfeasors would be reduced by the amount stipulated in
the covenant or the consideration paid in exchange for the covenant.
Such language is identical to the statutes in California, Michigan and
those states following the 1955 Uniform Act.9 2 Cases interpreting such
statutes have ruled that a subsequent monetary judgment against other
tortfeasors must be reduced by an amount equal to that stipulated in or
actually paid in exchange for the covenant.9" Such an interpretation indi-
cates a pro tanto reduction as compared to a pro rata reduction. Under
the pro rata method as used in those states following the 1939 Uniform
Act, if three tortfeasors are liable for a single injury and one settles with
the plaintiff, the amount of the judgment against the other two
tortfeasors must be reduced by one-third.94 The release or covenant exe-
cuted in those states must provide that the damages recoverable against
other tortfeasors are to be reduced-to the extent of the pro rata share of
89. Hodges v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 91 A.2d 473 (D.C. 1952). Cf. MItCH.
Comp. LAws ANN. § 600.2925a(3)(b) (Cure. Supp. 1979) (requires a reasonable effort be
made to notify the contributee of a pending settlement) (while the statute refers to con-
tributee, it should probably read contributor).
90. Albert v. Dietz, 283 F. Supp. 854 (D. Hawaii 1968); Markey v. Skog, 129 N.J. Super.
192, 322 A.2d 513 (1974).
91. Laws v. Spain, 312 F. Supp. 315 (E.D. Va. 1970); North River Ins. Co. v. Davis, 274 F.
Supp. 146 (W.D. Va. 1967); Bartlett v. Roberts Recapping, Inc., 207 Va. 789, 153 S.E.2d 193
(1967); Nationwide v. Jewel Tea Co., 202 Va. 527, 118 S.E.2d 646 (1961).
92. See supra notes 28 and 30.
93. McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 147 Cal. Rptr. 694 (1978); So-
botta v. Vogel, 37 Mich. App. 59, 194 N.W.2d 564 (1971); Wheeler v. Denton, 9 N.C. App.
167, 175 S.E.2d 769 (1970); Levi v. Montgomery, 120 N.W.2d 383 (N.D. 1963).
94. Smith v. Fenner, 399 Pa. 633, 161 A.2d 150 (1960).
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the released tortfeasor.9 5
Under the pro tanto method, there is no proportionate distribution of
negligence between tortfeasors before a reduction of the monetary judg-
ment occurs. The stated settlement figure is simply subtracted from any
award the plaintiff may subsequently receive against a nonsettling
tortfeasor. Many practitioners believe that the 1979 covenant statute did
not adequately express the legislature's intention to adopt such a method
of reduction. It should be noted, however, that a few courts have inter-
preted identical statutes to provide for a pro tanto reduction 6
The amended version attempts to clarify the language by removing the
word "claim" and substituting "verdict. '9 7 Otherwise a plaintiff may have
been required to reduce only his initial prayer for damages against a non-
settling tortfeasor by that amount already received against the settling
defendant. Any subsequent verdict would not have been reduced, and he
may have actually provided a total compensation larger than the plain-
tiff's entire claim was worth. The language now specifies that "any verdict
recovered against the other tortfeasors or any one of them shall be re-
duced by any amount stipulated by the covenant, or in the amount of the
consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater."98
VIII. APPLICABILITY OF THE COVENANT STATUTE TO PENDING CASES AND
CLAIMS
A split of authority has arisen concerning the application of a release
or covenant statute to claims arising before the effective date of the stat-
ute. The basic conflict deals with whether the provisions of the statute
are procedural or substantive in nature.
Those jurisdictions ruling that such statutes are procedural in nature
find that no vested rights will be impaired by retroactive application. In
an unanimous opinion"9 dealing with a covenant not to sue which fully
complied with the 1939 Uniform Act, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
said:
As the law stood at the time of the happening of the accident if any one of
95. Harding v. Evans, 207 F. Supp. 852 (D.Pa. 1962).
96. See supra text accompanying note 92.
97. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-35.1(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
98. Id. The word "release" was inadvertently omitted from this portion of the amended
statute and should be added by the 1981 legislature in order to reconcile all subsections
within the statute.
99. Smith v. Fenner, 399 Pa. 633, 161 A.2d 150 (1960); accord, Holve v. Draper, 95 Idaho
193, 505 P.2d 1265 (1973); Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 247 (1979).
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the three appellees had entered into a settlement of Smith's claim against
that particular appellee and if Smith had given a release to such appellee,
the other two appellees would thereby have been released from any claim by
Smith. The Uniform Act changed the effect of such release, if given, but it
effected no change in the cause of action nor did it increase what could have
been the liability of any one or all appellees at the time the cause of action
arose .... The change effected by the Uniform Act [was one of procedure
which] did not disturb any substantive right of any of appellees. 00
As a corollary to this reasoning, several courts have ruled that there is
no right of contribution between joint tortfeasors until the settlement or
joint judgment is paid by one of the tortfeasors. 1'0 If no cause of action
for contribution is established at the time the tort occurs, there is no
vested right which will be affected by a retroactive application.
Concerning retroactivity of the covenant statute, one preliminary ca-
veat is necessary; the tort may occur before the statute takes effect, but
the settlement instrument must become valid after the act's effective date
in order for the statute to apply.10 2 Smith v. Fenner further justifies this
reasoning by emphasizing that the release therein was executed after the
adoption of the applicable statute and "the parties knew or should have
known of the provisions of the Uniform Act."' 03
A contrary consideration often applied to the retroactivity issue is that
the covenant statute's provisions are substantive in nature and vested
rights will be disturbed if the statute is applied retroactively. Again a re-
lationship exists between covenants not to sue and contribution. A few
decisions, including an early Virginia case, have ruled that the right to
contribution exists from the time the tort occurs.104 One of these opinions
went so far as to distinguish the substantive right to contribution from
the procedural right to institute action for contribution arising when a
judgment is rendered or a settlement is made. 05 However, this reasoning
overlooks the fact that the first right is inchoate and contingent upon an
actual judgment or payment. Therefore it cannot be a vested right until
100. 399 Pa. at , 161 A.2d at 155.
101. Augustus v. Bean, 56 Cal. 2d 270, 363 P.2d 873, 14 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961); Pierce v.
Turner, 205 Cal. App. 2d 264, 23 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1962); Coniaris v. Vail Associates, Inc.,
Colo. _, 586 P.2d 224 (1978).
102. Kansas City So. Ry. v. McDaniel, 131 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1942).
103. 399 Pa. at , 161 A.2d at 155.
104. Distefano v. Lamborn, 81 A.2d 675 (Del. Super. Ct. 1951); F.H. Ross & Co. v. White,
224 Ga. 324, 161 S.E.2d 857 (1968); Massey v. Sullivan County, 225 Tenn. 132, 464 S.W.2d
548 (1971); Norfolk & So. Ry. v. Beskin, 140 Va. 744, 125 S.E. 678 (1924).
105. Distefano v. Lamborn, 81 A.2d 675 (Del. Super. Ct. 1951). Contra, Halifax Chick
Express Inc. v. Young, 50 DeL 596, 137 A.2d 743 (1957).
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one of these actions occurs; and if the vesting occurs after the contribu-
tion statute becomes effective, there is no problem with a retroactive
application.
Tennessee is the only state that has consistently ruled a covenant or
release statute may not be applied retroactively since such application
would destroy previous substantive rights.10 6 However, its decisions1 0 7 can
be distinguished from a similar set of facts in Virginia because the laws of
the two states before the present covenant statutes became effective were
very different. Before 1968, a covenant not to sue in Tennessee released
only the covenanting party, but the amount received for the release was
not credited to the judgment against a co-defendant. The plaintiff could
continue to receive a full judgment from the nonsettling party. After the
1955 Uniform Act was adopted,108 the consideration paid for the release
was credited to a subsequent judgment.
In Virginia before July 1, 1979, a covenant not to sue acted to release
everyone, and the plaintiff could expect to receive no judgment from a
nonsettling party; now, however, the covenant will act to release only the
covenantee and the convenantor will be entitled to a judgment minus the
consideration.
In Miller v. Sohns,109 the Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that the in-
jured party's right to make a covenant not to sue and receive full judg-
ment plus the consideration given for the covenant was a vested right at
the time the tort occurred and could not be restricted by the retroactive
application of the Uniform Act. In Virginia, however, an injured party
previously had no right to release a single tortfeasor and continue to ex-
pect any judgment from a nonsettling party. Consequently no substantive
right would be impaired by the retrospective covenant statute. 10
A review of previous Virginia cases regarding contribution shows that
courts have consistently (with only one early exception)"" viewed this
106. At first glance, Simmons v. Wilder, 6 N.C. App. 179, 169 S.E.2d 480 (1969) would
also seem to support the premise that substantive rights of release prevent retroactive appli-
cation of a covenant statute. However full review of the case shows that the release statute
in North Carolina at the time of the settlement was not applicable to plaintiff's wrongful
death action; also the 1955 UNIFoRM AcT had not become effective when the release was
signed. See note 103 supra and accompanying text.
107. Miller v. Sohns, 225 Tenn. 158, 464 S.W.2d 824 (1971); Massey v. Sullivan County,
225 Tenn. 132, 464 S.W.2d 548 (1971).
108. TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3105 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
109. 225 Tenn. 158, 464 S.W.2d 842 (1971).
110. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-35.1 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
111. Norfolk & So. R.R. v. Beskin, 140 Va. 744, 125 S.E. 678 (1924).
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right as arising when one joint tortfeasor pays a claim for which other
tortfeasors are also liable.11' s The payment may be either a monetary set-
tlement or satisfaction of a monetary judgment.11 s The courts view the
payment and the vesting of the contribution right as occurring simultane-
ously. Thus, it seems clear that the covenant statute will be applied retro-
actively to injuries occurring before July 1, 1979, so long as the covenant
not to sue is executed after that date.
IX. APPLICABILITY OF THE COVENANT STATUTE TO A VIcARIoUs LABILITY
SITUATION
Another issue which has resulted in a split of authority across the coun-
try is the applicability of a release or covenant statute to a situation
where the tortfeasors have not acted in concert; one is not himself negli-
gent in causing the tort but is liable only vicariously through the actions
of another.11 4 The negligence of an employee imputed to the employer
under the doctrine of respondeat superior is the most common example
of such a situation.
Some courts take the position that the release of an employee conclu-
sively negates the liability of the employer; if the employee is exonerated,
the only rational basis for the liability against the party who is seconda-
rily and derivatively liable is lost.1 5 One Missouri decision states further
that it does not matter how the servant is released from liability; so long
as he is free from blame, his master should also be held blameless.116 The
basis for this approach is that the employer and employee are not joint
tortfeasors; that is to say, they do not act in concert and, therefore, do
not fall within the older definition of joint tortfeasors.112 7 It is probably no
coincidence that all but one of the states that follow this approach have
adopted the 1939 Act or an independent statute of release. 1 8 This paral-
112. See note 91 supra.
113. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-34 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
114. See generally Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 533 (1976).
115. Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Coastal Distrib. Co., 273 F. Supp. 340 (D.S.C. 1967); Ba-
con v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Mo. 1962); Clark v. Brooks, 377 A.2d 365 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1977).
116. Max v. Spaeth, 349 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1961).
117. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
118. Tennessee adopts the concerted action approach but follows the 1955 UNIFORM ACT.
See Jones v. City of Memphis, 444 F. Supp. 27 (W.D. Tenn. 1977); Craven v. Lawson,
Tenn.__, 534 S.W.2d 653 (1976); Stewart v. Craig, 208 Tenn. 212, 344 S.W.2d 761 (1961).
But see O'Rear v. Oman Constr. Co., 210 Tenn. 651, 362 S.W.2d 217 (1962) (if both vicari-
ous liability and independant negligence are alleged, the plaintiff may sue the master or
employer if the covenant not to sue includes a specific reservation of rights).
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lel developed from the specific use of the words "joint tortfeasors." While
they clearly appear in the 1939 Act, they were omitted from the 1955 Act
because the authors hoped to quell the belief that both concerted action
and joinder of defendants were necessary prerequisites to the tortfeasor
terminology in the Act. While revision was being discussed, many states
continued to allow joinder only if the defendants acted in concert. They
refused to allow concurrently negligent tortfeasors to be joined or to be
called joint tortfeasors. Therefore the drafters of the 1955 Act believed
omission of "joint" would allow the Act to be applied to both concurrent
and concerted action between wrongdoers." 9
Their goal has been realized in most of the states where the 1955 Act
has been adopted, and most of these jurisdictions have ruled that a vicar-
iously liable wrongdoer is not automatically released when a co-defendant
is released. However, the Tennessee courts have refused to follow this
lead. They base their decisions on a theory that neither the Tennessee
legislators nor the Commissioners on Uniform State laws intended to in-
clude derivative liability within the statutes. In Craven v. Lawson,2 0 the
court stated that a change in the indemnity section of the 1955 Uniform
Act, when compared to the earlier Act, showed a clear intention to ex-
clude any situation where indemnity would apply. 2' Therefore, the court
reasoned that any covenant not to sue given to an employee would also
release the vicariously liable employer since their relationship invoked a
right to full indemnity.
Furthermore, the court reasoned that an employer's right to indemnify
the released employee could create a circuity of action. If the employer
was not also released, he would sue the employee for indemnification, and
the employee would in turn sue the plaintiff for breach of covenant. This
possibility would reduce a servant's desire to settle out of court since such
a settlement would not end his liability.'22
Although the facts of Craven are based upon an employer-employee
relationship, a broad interpretation of the decision could extend it to
119. 1955 UNIFORM ACT § 1, Commissioners' Note.
120. - Tenn. -, 534 S.W.2d 653 (1976).
121. The 1939 UNIFORM AcT § 6 reads: "This Act does not impair any right of indemnity
under existing law." The 1955 UNIFORM AcT § 1(f) adds: "Where one tortfeasor is entitled to
indemnity from another, the right of the indemnity obligee is for indemnity and not contri-
bution, and the indemnity obligor is not entitled to contribution from the obligee for any
portion of his indemnity obligation."
122. Note, Torts-Vicarious Liability-Covenant Not to Sue Servant or Agent as Affect-
ing Liability of Master or Principle, 44 TENN. L. RE v. 188 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as
Torts-Vicarious Liability].
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other active-passive indemnity situations. 123 However the court failed to
acknowledged that a suit by the plaintiff against an employer may not be
interpreted to be a breach of the covenant between the plaintiff and the
released party.12' Further, the Craven decision interpreted the pertinent
indemnity section to prevent any contribution, whereas that section can
be seen as merely defining the rights among tortfeasors without referring
to any rights the injured party may have against defendants. 22
Both Michigan and California, whose statutes are similar to Virginia's,
have refused to allow a covenant issued to an employee to act as a release
of his employer. However, the Michigan courts have seen fit to divide this
issue into two parts. An actual release of an employee will release the
employer,1 26 whereas a covenant not to sue an employee will not release
the employer.227 This solution seems to be poorly reasoned since the
Michigan statute itself eliminates any distinction between a release and a
covenant not to sue.
The recent case of Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Sweat 2 " contains an excel-
lent discussion of the split of authority on this issue. Under the Alaska
covenant statute,12 9 modeled after the 1955 Uniform Act, the court found
no reference to joint tortfeasors and no reason to hold that two or more
persons jointly or severally liable in tort may not include those who are
only vicariously liable. Even under the more restrictive 1939 Uniform Act,
two courts have ruled that a master and servant fit the definition of "joint
tortfeasors" as given in section one of that Act. 3 0
How Virginia will decide to rule in a vicarious liability situation may
depend upon how narrowly it defines a joint tortfeasor. Virginia proce-
dure has long allowed parties who were concurrent tortfeasors and not
acting in concert to be joined and, therefore, to be termed "joint
tortfeasors."1 311 Furthermore the legislative intent in refusing to mandate
a strict interpretation seems evident in the omission of any reference to
"joint tortfeasors" in the covenant act as presented to the legislature.23 2
123. For a discussion of the pros and cons of this extension, see id.
124. Hertz Corp. v. Hellens, 140 So. 2d 73 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
125. Torts-Vicarious Liability, supra note 122.
126. Witucke v. Presque Isle Bank, 68 Mich. App. 599, 243 N.W.2d 907 (1976).
127. Thomas v. Checker Cab Co., 66 Mich. App. 152, 238 N.W.2d 558 (1975).
128. 568 P.2d 916 (Ala. 1977).
129. ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.16.010-.060 (1978).
130. Holve v. Draper, 95 Idaho 193, 505 P.2d 1265 (1973); Smith v. Raparot, 101 R.I. 565,
225 A.2d 666 (1967); accord, Ritter v. Technicolor Corp., 27 Cal. App. 3d 152, 103 Cal. Rptr.
686 (1972).
131. North River Ins. Co. v. Davis, 274 F. Supp. 146 (W.D. Va. 1967).
132. 1979 Acts of Assembly c.697 (Act of March 31, 1979).
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While the statute does include the term "joint tortfeasors," a related stat-
ute33 regarding interpretation of section headlines indicates that these
must be considered as catch words only.184 Hopefully Virginia will con-
tinue in its modernization trend in tort law by choosing to follow those
states that have ruled a release of an employee does not automatically
release the vicariously liable employer.
X. CONCLUSION
Virginia has taken a major step in recognizing the right of a plaintiff to
settle his lawsuit with one tortfeasor while continuing to maintain his ac-
tion against another who is unwilling to approach the bargaining table.
The increased number of lawsuits and the rising costs involved mandate a
law that will encourage settlements while enforcing principles of fairness
and equity. Virginia's release and covenant not to sue law is a significant
effort in that direction.
Covenants not to sue and specially drawn releases may be used for per-
sonal injury, property damage and wrongful death claims in light of the
overwhelming acceptance of this practice in all other states and in light of
past Virginia affinity for compromising and settling all such claims. Such
covenants may be used to compromise a disabled person's claim so long
as the appropriate court first gives its approval.
Good faith in executing a valid covenant is a necessary requirement for
all parties involved. A disproportionate settlement figure alone is not
prima facie evidence of bad faith; however, the inequitable settlement will
mandate a thorough examination for possible collusion between the
parties.
A settling tortfeasor cannot be forced to contribute to another wrong-
doer after his settlement, nor can he expect to receive contribution from
another. A single exception arises when the covenant acts as an extin-
guishment of an entire cause of action. The noncovenanting party can
expect to receive a credit against his judgment equal to the consideration
stipulated in or exchanged for the covenant. If the covenantee settles for
less than his pro rata share of liability, the nonsettling party must then
pay the entire balance of the judgment even if this is more than his pro
rata share. Conversely, if the settling party pays more than his share, the
remaining co-defendant need only pay the balance and not his entire pro
rata share.
133. VA. CODE ANN. § 1-13.9 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
134. See Norfolk & W. Ry. v. White, 158 Va. 243, 163 S.E. 530 (1931); Jordon v. Town of
South Boston, 138 Va. 838, 122 S.E. 265 (1924).
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Under Virginia law, the covenant not to sue will probably be applied
retroactively to claims arising before July 1, 1979, without disturbing any
vested rights since no rights will vest until the release is executed and
consideration is exchanged.
Hopefully, the covenant statute will be deemed to cover a vicarious lia-
bility relationship so that a plaintiff releasing an employee will not inad-
vertently release his employer. In view of the fact that past Virginia law
does not prohibit this interpretation, such an approach will result in a
more uniform application of the new law and will be clearly indicative of
the intentions of the covenanting parties.
Linda Flory Rigsby

